In the framework of a first-price private-value auction, we study the seller as a player in a game with the buyers in which he has private information about their realized valuations. We find that depending upon his information, set of signals, and commitment power he may strategically transmit messages to buyers in order to increase his revenue. In an environment where the seller knows the rankings and lacks any commitment power, we find that the seller is unable to exploit his information. However, in an environment where the seller knows the realized valuations and can credibly announce either the true rankings or the true values (or announce nothing at all) but cannot commit as to which of these truthful messages to announce, then it is indeed possible to increase his revenue. If the seller, in addition, can commit to the full signaling strategy, then his expected revenue will be even higher. We believe that this line of research is fruitful for both better understanding behavior in auctions and finding paths to higher seller revenue.
Introduction
The standard model of a private-value auction assumes that while there is common knowledge of the joint distribution of valuations, buyers have private infor-mation about their own valuations. In this paper, we investigate the case where the seller is also informed about the buyers' private valuations. This can occur if either the seller possesses information about the buyers' types or information about the object's attributes.
A seller may have private information about the buyers' types if he simply possesses more information than one buyer about another buyer's type.
1 For example, this may occur when the bidders' identities are known only to the seller or if previous interactions revealed information (such as losing bids) only to the seller. It may also occur if, from experience, the seller is better at judging types of buyers than the buyers are at judging each others' types.
Knowledge about particular attributes of the object for sale is a second source of seller information. For example, a database programmer (the seller) knows both Oracle and Sybase, while O.com (buyer 1) needs an Oracle programmer and S.com (buyer 2) needs a Sybase programmer. Each company is only able to judge the value of the programmer's skills that are relevant to its needs, whereas the programmer can evaluate his worth to each of the companies. Thus, the seller knows the object's worth to each buyer and each buyer only knows his own valuation for that object. Studying our scenario of seller information may have additional implications. If possessing private information proves valuable to the seller, he may either seek to obtain information that he lacks or attempt to prevent the discovery of his information by others.
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Once we endow the seller with private information, we must include him as a player in a game and consider the strategic consequences of possible actions. This can be examined in either the framework of mechanism design as we do in a subsequent paper (Kaplan and Zamir, 2000) or within a specific auction design as we do here. The latter would be more appropriate when either it is illegal to change the auction design or there is a high cost to do so.
3 This may occur if the seller is uncertain about the type of his information at the time of auction design.
Possible specific auction designs to consider studying are those most com-1 This type need not be the precise valuation. For example, a buyer's type may be a preference for artwork by Picasso. This may indicate that for a particular work by Picasso he is more likely to have a higher valuation than a buyer without such preference.
2 The Internet auction company Ubid hides not only losing bids but the sales price the instant an auction closes. Other sites such as Auctionwatchers try to obtain and compile such information.
3 Changing the design may be illegal if, for instance, the government declares that a firstprice auction must be used or if the sale of the object is delegated to an auctioneer, the owner requests the use of a particular design from fear of collusion between the auctioneer and a buyer. It may also be impossible to change the design since such a design is a naturally occurring part of the environment, such as the database programmer eliciting job offers. It may be costly to change the design for both the buyers and the seller. For instance, an Internet auction company must implement the new design (rewrite software) and the buyers would need to learn the new rules.
monly used: English, second-price sealed-bid, first-price sealed-bid, and Dutch. In an English, private-value auction, bidding up to one's value is a dominant strategy independent of what additional information one possesses. In a second-price sealed-bid auction, again a dominant strategy exists independent of additional information. This leaves us with a first-price sealed-bid (or the strategically equivalent Dutch auction), which is the simplest case of a commonly used mechanism where, as we shall see, the strategic use of seller information has non-trivial implications. This is the subject of the present paper.
Some evidence of these implications is provided by Landsberger, et al. [1998] (henceforth LRWZ), who consider a standard first-price auction with two buyers in which the rankings of the buyers' valuations are common knowledge. They find that when the buyers' valuations are drawn from a uniform distribution, both buyers bid more aggressively in equilibrium than they would have without this information, and consequently, the seller's revenue is higher. Although for this result the seller is not assumed to know the rankings, it raises the interesting question of whether a seller with such private information can increase revenue by transmitting some of his information to the buyers, inducing an equilibrium similar to LRWZ. In answering this question, we must consider several properties of the environment: the seller's information, available set of messages and commitment power.
Using LRWZ as a baseline, we first examine an environment in which the seller knows the rankings and can publicly announce a message as to which buyer has the highest value. Although a seller who knows the rankings will typically know more, we consider this example to gain insight into the role of commitment power in this context. In fact, we find that when the seller lacks commitment power (the ability to commit to sending messages based upon his information), he cannot profit from his information and his lack of credibility causes him to send a message with no meaning that is ignored. This holds for any number of public messages. In contrast, if the seller could fully commit to transmitting the true rankings, he can gain, as indicated by the results of LRWZ. Their results also imply that if the seller could commit to either transmit the true rankings or not (send a 'white' signal), he would also be able to increase his revenue (by transmitting the true rankings).
We thus develop the notion of 'partial truthful commitment' according to which the seller is constrained to send a 'truthful' message, but has several such truthful messages to choose from. For example, when the seller knows that buyer 1 has a valuation of .2 and buyer 2 has a valuation of .4, he can transmit (publicly) the message "buyer 2 has the highest valuation." He can also transmit the message "buyer 1 has a valuation of .2 and buyer 2 has a valuation of .4." In addition, he can refrain from sending any signal (equivalently send a 'white signal'). However, he cannot commit to which of the three options he will choose. Although it may sound cryptic, this form of commitment seems reasonable. In general, if someone lies, it can be detected at some future date, perhaps an audit may reveal the truth. A lair would be subject to charges of fraud; however, not revealing all the information one possesses would not be punishable or at least much harder to prevent (although in a court of law, one swears to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth). Such a form of commitment was first used in the Persuasion Game (Milgrom [1981] ). In this game, a salesman reports the quality of a good (represented by a real number) to a buyer. His report (a subset of the real numbers) is restricted to contain the actual quality (known to the salesman).
To examine such a model, we consider the case where the seller knows the true valuations and can transmit the rankings (partial information), the valuations (the entire information), or a 'white' signal (no information). In this environment with such partial commitment, we show that the seller can still gain from his information. In particular, we find that the highest revenue generating equilibrium is that in which the seller sends the rankings when the low-value buyer has a value that is less than a fraction of the high-value buyer's value (half with a uniform distribution) and otherwise sends the values. Such an equilibrium is efficient.
Clearly any revenue achieved with partial truthful commitment can also be achieved with full commitment (i.e. by committing to use a certain signaling strategy). Thus, the next question is whether the seller can do strictly better if he has full commitment power. Previously, we saw that in the case where the seller knows only the rankings, both full and partial truthful commitment are equivalent. However, we show that this is not always the case by providing a strategy in the previous model (in which the seller knows the values) that by committing to use it, the seller induces a strictly higher expected revenue.
These results differ from two important results from earlier auction theory literature. First, the efficiency of the (highest revenue) partial commitment equilibrium violates the revenue equivalence of efficient auctions (Myerson [1981] , Riley and Samuelson [1981] ). Second, the strategy studied under full commitment is one of only partial revelation of seller information. This generates higher revenue than full revelation, in contrast to the Milgrom and Weber model [1982a, 1982b] in which full revelation of the seller's information provides the highest revenue.
Furthermore, this framework provides another insight into Strategic Information Transmission that is different from Crawford and Sobel [1982] . We note that in the Crawford-Sobel model information is partially disclosed due to the lack of commitment power on the part of the sender; under full commitment there is full revelation. In our model, partial disclosure of information takes place even when full commitment power is available, while nondisclosure occurs in the absence of commitment power.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the levels of commitment and the subsequently used notation. In Section 3, we show that a seller without commitment power cannot benefit from his knowledge of the rankings. We then examine the environment with the seller possessing full knowledge of the values and present the results of partial commitment and full commitment in Sections 4 and 5 respectively. In Section 6, we compare the different cases of our model and discuss their relationship to the works of Milgrom and Weber [1982] and Crawford and Sobel [1982] . We conclude in Section 7.
General Environment
Our investigation of the seller's strategic use of private information is based upon the following three-player game (with the seller and the two buyers as players), which is a standard Harsanyi game of incomplete information. The data of the game consists of the sets of valuations V 1 and V 2 , a cumulative probability distribution F on V = V 1 × V 2 , a partition π of V , and an alphabet A (a set of signals). The game is played as follows.
• Nature chooses the buyers' valuations (types) v = (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ V according to the distribution F .
• Buyer 1 is informed of v 1 , buyer 2 is informed of v 2 , and the seller is informed of π(v), the partition element of π containing v.
• The seller announces publicly 4 a message from his alphabet A.
• The buyers submit sealed bids b 1 and b 2 .
• The buyer with the highest bid gets the object and pays his bid to the seller.
In this game, we represented the seller's information about the buyers' valuations as a partition π of the buyers' type set V . The following are examples of such a partition.
Levels of Commitment
We continue to describe the environment by formally defining the levels of commitment that were mentioned in the introduction. Since some of the difference between the levels of commitment hinges on whether or not what the seller says is a 'true' statement. Before describing these levels of commitment we must define what we mean by 'truth' and 'truth-telling' strategies.
The seller's alphabet of signals is void of meaning without an interpretation function I, which assigns to any message a meaningful statement about the state of the world. Formally, let P(V ) be the set of all subsets (power set) of V , then an interpretation function is: I : A → P(V ). This interpretation function is part of the environment and cannot be chosen or influenced by the seller.
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For example, if the information is maximal, π = {{v}|v ∈ V }, and the alpha-
implies that the statement of a means that buyer 2 has the highest value and the statement of b means that buyer 1 has the highest value.
The set of pure strategies (of the seller) is S = {s : π → A}, or equivalently, S = {s : V → A| s is π-measurable}. The set of mixed strategies is Σ s = (S) (the set of probability distributions on S). The set of truth-telling pure strategies We now introduce four variants of games to capture the various levels of commitment power the seller may have. To avoid duplication we shall speak only of sets of (seller's) mixed strategies Σ s and Σ t s and consider the pure strategy sets S and S t as their subsets, respectively.
• A situation of no commitment corresponds to a game in which the seller's strategy set is Σ s .
• A situation of partial truthful commitment is described by a game in which the seller's strategy set is Σ t s .
• A situation of full truthful commitment is described by a Stackelberg leadership game in which the seller can credibly commit to choosing from a nonempty, truthful strategy set Σ ct s ⊂ Σ t s , where this restriction is commonly known by the buyers.
• A situation of full commitment is described by a Stackelberg leadership game, as before, where the seller can credibly restrict himself to a nonempty strategy set Σ c s ⊂ Σ s commonly known by the buyers. Loosely speaking, the above classification captures the four possibilities of available commitment power: whether or not the seller must use truthful messages, and whether or not he can credibly restrict his signaling strategy set. Formally, the first two games differ, as do the last two games, by the seller's strategy set, while the first two differ from the last two by their game structure.
The following example should provide insight into the definitions. The seller has information partition π = {w, x, y, z} (which values are in which partition element is not germane to the example). The alphabet is A = {a, b, c, d}. The interpretation of this alphabet, I, is I(a) = {w}, I(b) = {x}, I(c) = {w, x} and I(d) = {y, z}. Under no commitment, there would be no restrictions on the seller's strategy. Under partial truthful commitment, the seller would be restricted to sending a or c when informed of w, sending b or c when informed of x, and sending d when informed of y or z. Under full truthful commitment, the seller has the ability to credibly commit to choosing from a restricted strategy set of truthful strategies. For example, he could restrict himself to sending a when w, c when x, and d when y or z. Under full commitment, the restricted set may include non-truthful strategies. He can, for example, restrict himself to sending signal a when w, signal b when x, signal c when y (which is not truthful), and signal d when z.
As mentioned in the introduction, the idea of 'partial truthful commitment' is employed in the Persuasion game (Milgrom [1981] and Milgrom & Roberts [1986] ) where "truth" is captured in the form of allowing the seller of the good to send a message in the form of a set (in the quality space [0, 1]) containing the true quality. A similar notion appears later in Seidmann and Winter [1997] where the "truth" telling is captured by making the available set of signals state dependent (so that lying, which does not exist explicitly in their model, would correspond to a message which is not available in that state of information). In our model, the notion of "truth" is captured by the interpretation function.
Equilibrium
We denote the seller's strategy set as before and we let Σ i :
be buyer i's strategy set, where i is in the set of buyers B. The various games have strategy sets defined as follows:
• The no commitment game Γ n has strategy sets (Σ s , (Σ i ) i∈B ).
• The partial truthful commitment game Γ pt has strategy sets (Σ t s , (Σ i ) i∈B ).
• The full commitment game Γ f has strategy sets (Σ s , (Σ * i ) i∈B ), where
• The full truthful commitment game Γ f t has strategy sets (Σ 
A sequential equilibrium for Γ pt and a subgame-perfect equilibrium for Γ f t are defined in a similar way.
As can be seen from these definitions, the (only) subgames considered in Γ f and Γ f t are those resulting from fixing the strategy of the seller to σ s ∈ Σ s . In Γ n and Γ pt , there are no such subgames and we resort to a notion of sequential equilibria.
Throughout this paper, an equilibrium in Γ n (or in Γ pt ) stands for a sequential equilibrium and an equilibrium in Γ f (or Γ f t ) stands for subgame-perfect equilibrium.
General Implications
Before analyzing specific environments, it is worthwhile to see what general results can already be derived from the above definitions. In what follows, we provide some weak inequalities among the different levels of commitment. In subsequent sections, we give specific examples showing that these inequalities can be strict.
We use the following definition to compare games, using the appropriate equilibrium concept for each. Definition: Given two games Γ andΓ and a player i in both of them, let H i andH i be the payoff functions of player i in Γ andΓ respectively. We say that i does better in Γ than inΓ (and write Γ iΓ ) if:
1. For any equilibrium σ of Γ, there is an equilibriumσ ofΓ such that
2. For any equilibriumσ ofΓ, there is an equilibrium σ of Γ such that 
There exists a subgame-perfect equilibriumσ in Γ f such thatσ B ∈ Σ * B (σ). (Substitute the payoffs of the σ s branch into the tree. There is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of this new tree; thus, there is one in the old tree as well.) Notice that this implies that H f s (σ) ≥ H s (σ) (to avoid confusion, we write H f s as the payoff in Γ f ). Thus, for any equilibrium σ in Γ n , there is an equilibriumσ in Γ f with weakly higher payoff to the seller (establishing condition 2 for Γ f s Γ n ).
Let E n be the set of sequential equilibria of Γ n , and let
For any subgame-perfect equilibrium σ 
Verifiability
What may allow some form of commitment to a specific signaling strategy? A possible answer is the availability of some type of verification at a future point in time. That is, a seller can commit to a strategy set if eventually one can discover the seller's information and verify if the signal sent is consistent with that set of signaling strategies. In the following, we will formalize the definition of a verifiable strategy set and investigate the implications for the levels of commitment that we examine. In particular, we will show that our notion of partial-truthful commitment is reasonable since the truthful-strategy set is verifiable.
For
An example of a set of pure strategies which is not verifiable is the following. The seller has an information partition of two elements, π 1 and π 2 , and has two signals, a and b, at his disposal. Consider the following strategy set S c = {s 1 , s 2 }, where s 1 (π 1 ) = a, s 1 (π 2 ) = b, s 2 (π 1 ) = b and s 2 (π 2 ) = a. This set is not verifiable, since, for example, s 3 defined by
Proposition 2.2
The set of pure truthful strategies, S t , is verifiable.
We now make a comparable definition of verifiability for mixed strategies.
Denoting by Con(D) the convex-hull of the set D, we have: 
Second, the extreme points of Σ c are pure strategies. In fact, if Σ c is Σ-verifiable and
. It remains to prove that this S c is a verifiable set of pure strategies. This follows from noticing that Σ c (v) = S c (v) for all v ∈ V and hence: for alls ∈ S,
To prove the 'if' part of the statement, let S c be a verifiable set of pure strategies. We want to show that Con(S c ) is Σ-verifiable, i.e. we have to show that for all In the general game-theoretical framework, one may ask whether a sender of a signal in a game would ever want to commit to a non-verifiable strategy. We can provide the answer with an example of such a case.
Consider a game with two receivers playing the following game:
6,1 0,0
This game has two pure equilibria, (l, r) and (r, l) with payoffs (1, 6) and (6, 1), respectively, a mixed-strategy equilibrium with payoff (3, 3) (both play (1/2, 1/2)) and a large set of correlated equilibria including one with payoff (4, 4) (probability 1/3 for each of (l, l), (l, r), and (r, l)). If the sender's payoff is the sum of both receiver's payoffs, he would have incentive to help them obtain a correlated equilibria. He cannot credibly use this correlated mixture of (1/3 (l, l)+ 1/3 (l, r) + 1/3 (r, l)), since he prefers the choice of (l, l) which gives him a payoff of 10 (as opposed to a payoff of 8). There is no method to verify that he was not mixing according to the correlated equilibrium even if most of the time he is sending the corresponding signals to obtain (l, l) (unless of course in an infinitely repeated play setup where the mixed strategy can be statistically tested with arbitrarily large precision). We conclude that the sender would like to commit to the mixed non-verifiable signaling strategy leading to the correlated equilibrium.
In the classic way of treating correlated equilibria, the previous example would entail private signals. We now show that such correlated equilibria also exist when the sender is limited to a public message. Thus, a desire for commitment to non-verifiable exists for public signals as well. Take the previous game with the following modification. For each receiver, there is a coin flip seen only by him and the sender. The sender publicly mentions which action to take; however, a receiver does the action mentioned if his coin is heads and the other action if his coin is tails. The correlated equilibrium are analogous to those in the previous game, since, as before, each receiver believes the other receiver has a equal chance of choosing each action.
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In the following, we can formally see the above results. Each coin can have two possible outcomes: heads or tails. We define the set of outcomes as C = {h, t}. Each player has two possible moves: l or r. His set of moves is M = {l, r}. The sender has an alphabet of private signals (recommendations) to send to the players A = {L, R}. The sender's pure strategy set is S s : C 2 → A 2 , while each player has the strategy set of Let us define a player's strategy e as follows:
e(t, L) = r, and e(t, R) = l.
Notice that if the sender commits to using strategy 1/3a + 1/3b + 1/3c, the players have an equilibrium using strategy e. Also note that without a commitment, the sender would have incentive to deviate to always sending a, which would result in the players playing one of the Nash equilibrium mentioned above.
Connections among different levels of commitment power
As it is intuitively clear, the interpretation function is crucial in determining the outcome of the game. The next two propositions show that a limited interpretation function can serve as a substitute of a commitment device in the partial and full truthful commitment cases.
Proposition 2.4 For each equilibrium with full commitment: (i) There exists an interpretation function for which an outcome equivalent equilibrium exists with full truthful commitment. (ii) When the equilibrium strategy set chosen in the first stage of full commitment is verifiable, there exists an interpretation function for which an outcome equivalent equilibrium exists with partial truthful commitment as well. For each equilibrium with full truthful commitment: (iii) When the equilibrium strategy set chosen in the first stage of full truthful commitment is verifiable, there exists an interpretation function for which an outcome equivalent equilibrium exists with partial truthful commitment.
Proof: Part (i) follows trivially by noting that any given full commitment equilibrium becomes a full truthful equilibrium if we change the interpretation function toĨ(a) = V , for all a ∈ A (i.e. all messages are truthful).
To prove (ii), consider a full commitment equilibrium in which the seller restricts his strategy set to S c (a subset of pure strategies). Define an interpretation function I as follows: for a ∈ A, let The content of the last proposition is that the interpretation function can act as a form of substitute for commitment power. Consequently, within a specific framework a seller can benefit from having one interpretation function over another. For example, a seller may benefit from having an interpretation function become finer or coarser. We can see this when the seller has full information with full truthful commitment. Consider the case of two buyers with i.i.d. valuations uniformly distributed on [0, 1] . When the only truthful statement is to state the values, the seller's revenue is 1/3 as in the English auction. When there is only one truthful message that conveys no value, the seller's revenue is also 1/3 as in a first-price auction. When there is a truthful statement that states the rankings, the seller's revenue is at least .3696 as in LRWZ.
This shows room for a strategic influence on the interpretation function. In a dynamic model, players (e.g. lawyers) may try to make the interpretation function more specific or less specific. In an evolutionary model, a language (represented by an interpretation function) may develop based on needs of players.
When the Seller knows the Rankings and has no Commitment Power.
We begin our analysis of auctions by examining the case when the seller has no commitment power, but has information as to which buyer has the highest value (the rankings). Here the seller has the same information that the buyers possess in LRWZ. Thus, we are able to ask whether or not a seller without commitment power can gain from having such information by communicating with the buyers.
First, we assume that the seller has to publicly report the rankings. He thus has two possible actions: to lie or tell the truth. We show that in this situation the seller cannot gain from his information. Second, we show that if the seller can send any public message based upon his information, he can still not gain.
Consider a standard first-price sealed-bid private-value auction with valuations drawn independently from a continuous differentiable distribution on [0, 1] . In the Harsanyi framework of games with incomplete information, this is a game with state space V = [0, 1] 2 . If the seller knows only the rankings of the realized valuations, his information is given by the partition π = {H, L} of V where
As mentioned, each buyer knows his own valuation. The seller sends a public message and the buyers send sealed bids. The buyer with the higher bid gets the object and pays his bid.
Messages that Convey the Truth or Lie
To gain some intuition about the results we first assume that the seller can only report the rankings. Formally, he can either say h or l where h implies v 1 ≥ v 2 and l implies v 1 < v 2 , that is, I(h) = H and I(l) = L. A (pure) strategy is then a mapping s : {H, L} → {h, l}. Assume further that he is restricted to one of the two strategies:
With this restriction a seller's mixed strategy is a probability p (0 ≤ p ≤ 1) that he will transmit the true information (i.e. p is the probability of using s t and (1 − p) is the probability of using s l ).
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We restrict our attention to equilibria where the buyers use a differentiable, strictly-increasing bid function. With a minor abuse of notation, we shall write b p l for the bid function of the low-signal buyer (buyer 1 when l is announced and buyer 2 when h is announced) when the seller's strategy is p. Similarly, we write b 
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. In both cases of p, we will show that if a point exists where the opposite relationship of b p h and b p l holds then, the differential equations derived from the equilibrium first-order conditions imply that these functions cannot meet at any value greater than this point, in contradiction to Lemma 3.1.
Fix p > 0.5 and assume that for some
For simplicity of notation, we omit the superscript p and write b l and b h for the bidding functions at equilibrium (at p) and their inverse functions by v l and v h , respectively. The (conditional) expected payoff of a low-signal buyer with value v when bidding b = b l (v) is (note that since b l (v) < b h (v) and b h is increasing, the low-signal buyer with value v will certainty lose if he has in fact the low value):
The expected payoff of a high-signal buyer with value v when bidding b = b h (v) is:
These equations would be valid as long as b l (v) < b h (v) or until the two bid functions meet. From Lemma 3.1, we know that the bid functions must meet at a point greater than v. Letv > v be the meeting point closest to v. At such a point, the b l would meet b h from below, which implies
Since p > .5, this limit is strictly greater than 1. Thus, (v) and implies that they cannot meet at a point greater than v violating Lemma 3.1. Similarly, when p < .5, there is also a contradiction
Proposition 3.1 In all equilibria of this game, the seller uses strategy p = .5.
Proof:
Let v H be the (true) high value and v L be the low value. The seller's expected revenue is
and hence deviating to p = 0 (always lying) will be profitable. Thus, any p > .5 cannot be part of an equilibrium. Likewise, any p < .5 cannot be part of an equilibrium as well. Therefore, the only possible equilibrium strategy for the seller is p = .5. 2
Note that a strategy of p = .5 is equivalent to sending no information at all. This establishes our assertion that by publicly communicating the rankings with no commitment power, the seller cannot increase his revenue.
Multiple Signals
We now strengthen the results of the previous section by showing that when the seller knows the rankings and has no commitment power, he cannot gain from his information even with a richer set of signals.
Assume that the seller has the ability to send any message from an alphabet A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . .}. Given a randomized strategy (either mixed or behavioral), 9 let h i = P (a i |H) and l i = P (a i |L) (that is, h i is the probability that the seller sends a i when he has information H and similarly for l i ).
Let P (L|a i , v j ) be the probability of the event L (v 1 < v 2 ) given signal a i and given the value of buyer j is v j . (Note that P (a i |L, v i ) = P (a i |L) = l i 9 By Kuhn's Theorem, there is no loss of generality in considering only strategies in {s : {H, L} → (A)} (behavioral strategies) since the seller in this game has perfect recall (since he has only one move).
and P (a i |H, v i ) = P (a i |H) = h i , since the seller's strategy is a function of his information -H or L -only.) By Bayes' rule, we have: The following lemma confirms the intuition that in equilibrium, a buyer who is more likely to have the lower valuation (given the signal) bids more aggressively than the other buyer, who is more likely to have the higher valuation.
Lemma 3.3 If
Proof: We prove the first statement. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.2.
If the statement is not true, then for some k, we have h k < l k and some neighborhood in (0, 1) where
When v 1 is in such a region and buyer 1 bids x in the neighborhood of b k 1 (v 1 ), his expected payoff is equal to
Also, when v 2 is in such a region and buyer 2 bids x in the neighborhood of b k 2 (v 2 ), his expected payoff is equal to
We look at the first-order conditions of the above expected payoffs since each bid must maximize expected payoff and each global maximum must also be a local maximum.
These equations hold when both v 1 and v 2 are in the region where b 
We have (using (3) and (4)):
Thus, we obtain that when b In a similar way it is shown that if
Let π(a i |H) be the expected seller's revenue when signal a i is sent and buyer 1 has the highest valuation and π(a i |L) be the expected seller's revenue when signal a i is sent and buyer 1 has the lowest valuation. Note that ((v, v) |v 1 ≥ v 2 ) (we assume there is a symmetric continuous distribution of values). Now notice that π(a j | (v, v) (v, v) ). Thus, by comparing the integrals pointwise, we find that π(a j |L) > π(a j |H). In a similar manner, we can show that
Proof: Let us show that π(a j |L) > π(a j |H). First notice that for any values
0 < v < v < 1, f((v, v)|v 1 < v 2 ) = f) = b j 2 (v) and π(a j |(v, v)) = max{b j 1 (v), b j 2 (v)}. However, b j 2 (v) > max{b j 1 (v), b j 2 (v)}, which implies π(a j |(v, v)) > π(a j |π(a k |H) > π(a k |L). 2 Proposition 3.2 In any equilibrium, (i) h i = l i for all i (i.e.,
no information regarding the rankings is conveyed by the seller's signaling). (ii) The seller's expected revenue is the same as in the standard model with no signaling.
Proof: If (i) does not hold, then there are j and k such that h j > l j and h k < l k . This implies that h j = P (a j |H) > 0 and l k = P (a k |L) > 0. For this to be part of an equilibrium, the seller must have no incentive to always send a k instead of a j in state H and no incentive to always send a k instead of a j in state L, that is:
, which contradicts the second part of Lemma 3.4 (π(a k |L) < π(a k |H)). Thus, for all messages h i = l i . 2
While we study only public messages, the results of no commitment also hold for private messages (we omit the proof). This agrees with Farrell and Gibbons [1989] who study the difference between public and private messages in a game with no commitment power and two receivers. Under symmetry, their results imply that any equilibrium with meaningful private messages also exists with meaningful public messages. Thus, if there is no equilibrium with meaningful public messages, there won't be an equilibrium with meaningful private messages.
Partial Commitment
Consider a situation in which the seller knows the valuations and can send as a public message the valuations, the rankings, or a white signal φ (equivalent to sending no signal).
10 Formally, the seller's information is
and his set of signaling strategies, as mentioned before, is
Under partial (truthful) commitment, this strategy would be limited to signals which are truthful. We can write the appropriate interpretation function as I ((h, l) 
With partial commitment, the seller must choose his pure strategy from the truthful strategy set:
Which in this case is equivalent to:
That is, the seller could send (h, l) only when v 1 ≥ v 2 , the rankings of (l, h) only when v 1 < v 2 , the values (v 1 , v 2 ) only when these are the true values, or 10 We should note that under such information conditions either a mechanism of making a take-it-or-leave-it offer of v h to the high-value buyer or a first-price auction with a reserve price set to v h will give the seller all the possible surplus. In spite of this, our interest in a first-price auction without a reservation price is more than just academic. In addition to the several reasons mentioned in the introduction for a seller being restricted in his ability to redesign the auction, the lack of a possible reservation price could be due to a seller being forced to sell. A buyer knowing this would not believe any set reservation price (or take-it-or-leave-it offer). φ in any case. Thus, for any particular set of values (v 1 , v 2 ), there are only three truthful signals. Let us call these options φ, r, and v, where r (stands for rankings) is the appropriate choice of (h, l) or (l, h). Therefore, an equivalent choice for the seller is the choice of 'pressing one of three buttons' labeled φ, r and v.
In examining the equilibria of this game, we make the assumption:
Assumption 4.1 A buyer never bids above his value.
As opposed to full (truthful) commitment, any equilibrium strategy of the seller must be profit maximizing given his information. That is, given any pair of valuations v 1 , v 2 if in equilibrium r is sent, it must generate revenue at least as high as if v or φ were sent. Likewise for v and φ.
Using this property, we can now characterize the set of equilibria by the following lemmatta (the first Lemma is well known but for completeness we provide its proof in the Appendix). Throughout this section, we consider the possibility of mixed strategies on the part of the buyers. That is, the equilibrium strategies of the buyers, given v and the signal sent, consist of distributions on b l and b h .
Lemma 4.1 In any equilibrium, if v is sent, then if v l < v h , the winning bid will be at the lowest valuation and won by the high-value buyer:
b h = v l and P (b l < v h ) = 1. If v l = v h = v then
both buyers bid v with probability one (and hence the winning bid will, again be v).
The proof is given in the Appendix. 2.
Lemma 4.2 In any equilibrium of the game with the seller, the expected winning bid will be weakly greater than the lower valuation: E[max{b
Proof: If the expected winning bid were strictly lower than the lower valuation, then the seller could profitably deviate by sending v and getting the lowest value by Lemma 4.1. 
Lemma 4.3 For any c > 0 there is an > 0 such that D c is disjoint from V (φ).
Proof: Notice first that this Lemma implies that V (φ) is disjoint from D 0 (i.e. that V (φ) cannot contain a point on the diagonal except possibly (0, 0)). To gain some intuition on the main argument, let us first prove this fact separately.
Assume, by contradiction, that φ is sent by the seller at a point v 1 = v 2 = c > 0. By Lemma 4.2 and Assumption 4.1, the winning bid must be equal to c. This can only happen if both buyers bid c with certainty. (If neither buyer is bidding c with certainty, then, with positive probability, the winning bid would be lower than c. If only one buyer bids c with certainty, he would have incentive to lower his bid.) In particular, buyer 2 is bidding c with certainty. Since the seller can send φ at any time when v 1 < v 2 = c, the expected winning bid must be weakly greater than c for all v 1 < v 2 = c. This can only occur if b 2 = c for all values v 1 < v 2 = c. However, this is cannot be an equilibrium strategy, since buyer 2 has incentive to deviate to bidding, say, c/2 and expect a positive profit.
Returning now to the proof of the Lemma, assume that v = (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ V (φ) and v is also in D c for c > 0. Assume that v 1 ≤ v 2 . This means that φ is sent while:
We shall show that for small enough, this leads to a contradiction. For a constant k > 0 (to be specified later) let
The expected selling price is then at most (using Assumption 4.1 and (5)):
Since, by Lemma 4.2, this is at least v 1 , we have
Letting z = max{q 1 , q 2 } and z(k) = 1 − 1/k, this implies z ≥ z(k). We can deduce that at least one buyer, say i, bids so that P (b i ≥ v 1 − k ) ≥ z(k) and hence the expected selling price is at least z(k)(v 1 − k ), and consequently, the expected payoff of buyer i is at most:
Choose large enough k such that 1
). We conclude that if < 1 , and
there is a buyer i with equilibrium expected payoff less than (by (6))
On the other hand, by ignoring the seller's message and bidding b i = v i /2, buyer i guarantees expected payoff of at least (
), which can be made larger than ) for < 2 . For < min{ 1 , 2 } this yields a profitable deviation from the equilibrium strategy; a contradiction which completes the proof. 2 Definition: Given a strategy σ ∈ Σ t of the seller and buyer i with value v i , we say that
Definition: We say that a buyer i makes an h-bid if when he has a value v i and receives a signal a, he bids
and v −i is consistent with the signal a} whenever the set over which the sup is taken is not empty.
That is, given the signal sent and beliefs about the seller's strategy, a buyer can form beliefs about the other buyer's possible valuations; he makes an h-bid (based on his beliefs) if he bids the sup of all other buyer's possible values that are lower than his own valuation based one's beliefs, if, indeed, there are such values.
Lemma 4.4 In any equilibrium, if a high-value buyer knows (with certainty) he has the high value, he makes an h-bid.
Proof: When the signal sent is v, this follows from Lemma 4.1. When the signal sent is r or φ, from Lemma 4.2, we know that the expected winning bid must be at least v l . Denoting by v l , the sup of the v l values compatible with the respective signal in equilibrium, we must also have
Since buyer H knows he has the highest valuation, he also knows that buyer L will bid at most v l . Therefore, in equilibrium, he will never bid more than v l . Since buyer L also never bids more than v l , the winning bid when v l = v l must equal v l . This can only occur if at least one of the two buyers is bidding v l with certainty. If P (b h = v l ) < 1, any buyer L, with value close enough to v l , would have incentive 2 ). Using repeatedly this argument, we conclude that there is a chain of points: We already know (by Lemma 4.2) that when v is sent, the outcome is efficient, therefore any inefficiency must occur when r or φ is sent. When L wins, he bids his value and thus must know for sure that he has the low value even if φ is sent. If this were not the case, by Assumption 4.1, he can generate positive expected profits by bidding less than his value since he will have the high value and win the auction with positive probability.
Lemma 4.5 In any equilibrium, if a buyer i with value v i knows that whenever the other buyer j has a value v j > v i he makes an h-bid, then buyer i also makes an h-bid.

Proof: This is only different from Lemma 4.4 when the signal sent is φ. A buyer with value v i who bids b expects a payoff of
Since L wins with positive probability, there is a region W ⊂ V where this happens and P (W ) > 0. Without loss of generality, we may assume that W is a rectangle: 
By Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7, if in equilibrium
, when φ or r is sent, buyer H's equilibrium strategy is to bid v l and then win, we have
where P (b|s) is the probability that H will win the auction with bid b given signal s is sent.
φ). By Assumption 4.1 (buyers do not bid higher than their valuations), we know that for all
From (7), (8) and (9), we obtain
Multiplying the first inequality by P (r|v h ), the second by P (φ|v h ) and adding yields:
This concludes the proof. 2 
Corollary 4.1 When the distribution function is uniform, the limit for
, otherwise he sends r or φ (which of these is sent may depend upon v).
• The auction is won always by the high valuation buyer i who pays v j when v is announced and f i (v i ) otherwise.
Proof: An equilibrium that did not satisfy the above conditions would violate the conditions set forth in Lemmatta 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9. 2
Remark:
The following is an equilibrium in which φ is sent as part of the seller's signaling strategy.
• • Off equilibrium: a buyer receiving φ when .2 < v i < .8 still believes that
and bids (v i − .4)/for v i > .4 and for .< v i ≤ .4. A buyer receiving H when v h > .8 bids .(believes v l < .2). A buyer receiving L when v l > .4 believes that v h is uniform between v l and 1 and bids accordingly (less than v l ).
Proof: We see that this is an equilibrium with the following. There is no v for which the seller would like to switch his signal. Let us check all the possibilities.
• Sending v instead of r: this could only lower the winning bid from v h /2 to v l .
• Sending φ instead of r: if v h < .2, this would change the winning bid to
2, the winning bid is either v l or (v h − .4)/2, however both of these are less than v h /2, the winning bid if r is sent.
• Sending r instead of φ: this will keep the winning bid at .2.
• Sending v instead of φ: this will only lower the winning bid from .2 to v l .
• Sending r instead of v: this will lower the winning bid to either v h /2 if v h < .8 or to .2 otherwise.
• Sending φ instead of v: if v l < v h < .2, sending φ will generate expected revenue of (1/4)v h + (3/16)v l which is less than v l since v h < 2v l ; if v h > .2, the winning bid is either v l or (v h − .4)/2 and can only lead to an increase
There is no signal sent for which the buyers would like to switch their strategies.
• When v is sent: behavior is as shown in Lemma 4.1.
• When r is sent: behavior is as shown in Lemma 4.4.
• When φ is sent: in equilibrium, H knows he is high and knows that L is bidding v i with probability 2/3 and 0 with probability 1/3. If H bids .2 in equilibrium, he wins with certainty. If H bids x < .2, he has expected payoff of ((1/3)(x/.2) + (2/3))(v − x). This is increasing in x when v ≥ 2x + . Proof: Using the previous remark, the equilibrium with f 1 (v) = f 2 (v) = (1/2)v is the equilibrium that yields the highest expected revenue for the seller.
11 Given v h = x, with probability 1/2, the signal r is sent and the selling price is x/2 and with probability 1/2, the signal v is sent and the expected payoff (the conditional density of v l is 2/x) is 
Full Commitment
We will now see that the seller can generate strictly higher profits under full commitment power than under the cases of partial or no commitment power studied thus far. Using the same strategy sets and interpretation function as in the last section, we can see that a seller with full commitment power is able to announce more than just the rankings or values. For instance, within the same alphabet and interpretation function the seller can now send the maximum of the two values by sending (0, max{v 1 , v 2 }) (this is interpreted as a point in V , i.e. v 1 = 0, v 2 = max{v 1 , v 2 } which is (almost surely) not a truthful message).
We will now see that this strategy of publicly announcing the value of the high-value buyer will result in higher profits for the seller.
12 In such a case, the low-value buyer knows both values, while the high-value buyer knows only that he has the highest value.
We retain our Assumption 4.1 that a buyer does not bid above his value. 
The proof is given in the Appendix. 2
The analytical computation of the profits in the equilibrium of the uniform distribution case, is done in the Appendix and summarized in the following proposition (we denote ϕ(z) = 
Remark While the equilibrium established here is for full commitment power, it can be easily made an equilibrium of a full truthful commitment model by slightly modifying the interpretation function as follows (see Proposition 2.4):
As under the usual interpretation function I((h, l)) = {{v}|v ∈ V and v 1 ≥ v 2 }, and I((l, h) 
We conjecture that our results can also show that under full truthful commitment power the seller's revenue can be higher than partial truthful commitment power. We believe that the addition of two other signals will not lead to additional equilibrium allocations under partial commitment power. These two other signals are max{v 1 , v 2 } and min{v 1 , v 2 }. That is the seller is able to announce the highest value or the lowest value with the buyers aware whether the announced value is the highest. This would imply that the above mentioned seller strategy would also be a valid seller strategy with full truthful commitment power and a signal set that has the same equilibrium allocations as in the partial truthful commitment section. Thus, we provide a case where moving from partial truthful commitment power to full truthful commitment power increases seller revenue.
We present the logic for the above conjecture in the following. In any partial truthful commitment equilibrium, announcing max{v 1 , v 2 } is equivalent to sending the rankings, while announcing min{v 1 , v 2 } is equivalent to sending the values. The reason for this is that, in equilibrium, the winning bid will be greater than min{v 1 , v 2 } otherwise the seller would have incentive to send the values. When this is sent, the equilibrium would have the high-value buyer win the auction at the lowest value. For similar logic as presented in the partial truthful commitment section, the high-value buyer must win at the highest of the possible low-values he may face. Announcing max{v 1 , v 2 } will inform the buyers of the rankings and the L buyer of the H buyer's value. This will not help the L, buyer, since the H buyer will still win. The only question is whether there can be two regions (as with r and φ): one where the rankings is sent and one where max is sent. Since the seller can send (h, l) instead of max{v 1 , v 2 } = v 1 and vis-versa, the high-value buyer's bid must be the same in either region. Thus, the set of equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to before.
Discussion
Comparison among environments
The expected profits to the seller, low-value buyer and high-value buyer are displayed in Figure 3 for the case of uniform distribution. The results of LRWZ [1998] showed when the buyers are informed of their rankings (b), the expected profit for the seller is higher than in the standard first-price auction (a). The auction is no longer efficient, and this inefficiency is measured by the 'Welfare Loss' in the last column of Figure 3 which is defined as the total expected surplus (buyers' plus the seller's) minus total possible surplus.
Our first results indicated that without commitment power (c), the seller could not take advantage of the knowledge of the rankings and the equilibria would be equivalent to that of case (a). Only with full commitment power can the seller obtain the expected revenue of model (b).
Our next set of results are for the environment in which the seller knows the values. With partial commitment power (d), the seller can generate more revenue than in the case in which he has no information (a). This is even higher than the expected revenue when the buyers know the rankings (b) . Surprisingly, the equilibrium of this model is efficient (no welfare loss).
While partial commitment power (d) is useful to the seller, with full commitment (e) the seller can generate even higher revenues using the strategy described in the previous section. However, in generating higher revenue, the induced equilibrium loses the efficiency property.
On the buyer side, we see that with full commitment (e) the low-value buyer has additional information v h . In equilibrium this decreases payoffs of both buyers compared to the situation (b) in which both players just know the rankings. The low-value buyer would rather commit to not looking at v h but he cannot credibly do so (it cannot be part of a sequential equilibrium).
This type of situation occurs elsewhere in economics. For instance, in a Cournot duopoly, if the (Stackelberg) leader credibly transmits his output quantity, the follower would do better by committing to not looking at the information; however, without a commitment power, the follower would not be credible in saying he 'would not look at the leader's information'; it is not a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Relationship to Classic Results
Our results stand in contrast to two landmark results of auction theory: revenue equivalence in private-value auctions (Myerson [1981] and Riley and Samuelson [1981] ) and optimality of full revelation of the seller's information (Milgrom and Weber [1982a, 1982b] ).
As we saw in our framework, two efficient private-value auctions need not have the same revenue. In the partial commitment model, the equilibrium is efficient yet expected revenue is higher than that in the standard first or second price auction (5/12 = 0.4167 compared to 1/3, for the uniform case). As to the revelation of information by the seller, Milgrom and Weber have an implicit assumption that the seller has full commitment power, so any signal by him is credible.
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The appropriate comparison is therefore to our full commitment framework and there we find that in equilibrium when the seller reveals his information (the realized values) only to the low-value buyer, the expected revenue is higher than if the seller would commit to reveal publicly all his information (0.4503 compared to 1/3, in the uniform case).
More surprisingly is the fact that except one assumption, our model can be viewed as a special case of the Milgrom-Weber general model. They assume:
• Each buyer i has a private signal X i (which is v i in our case).
• The seller has a private signal S.
• There is symmetry of bidder utility functions,
(which is just x i in our case). Utility u i is symmetric in the other bidders' signals {x j } j =i (in our case it is independent of these other signals). The buyers' utility is continuous and non-decreasing in its variables.
• S 1 , . . . , S m , X 1 , . . . , X n are affiliated.
• The distribution density f(s, x) of (S, X) is symmetric in X (= (X 1 , . . . , X n )).
It is only this last assumption which is not satisfied in our model. For instance, when the seller's information is H ="buyer 1 has the highest valuation," then clearly the density of (H;
These observations about the relationship of our model to the Milgrom-Weber model indicate that their assumption of the symmetry of distribution is a very crucial one. A more general framework with its relaxation could lead to important results.
Relationship to the Crawford-Sobel Model
In "Strategic Information Transmission," Crawford and Sobel [1982] 2 , while the receiver's utility is −(y − s) 2 . They find that without commitment power, each equilibrium is defined by a partition π of [0, 1] where the sender sends π(s), the partition element containing s. The partition sent never fully reveals the state since all partitions contain multiple states {s} = π(s). In such an equilibrium, both parties gain in expected payoffs (over the no information model) if there are at least two elements in π.
We can compare this to our model if the message space (alphabet) and interpretation function are such that for any state s in [0, 1] there is a message m such that I(m) = {s}. Using our definitions of the various commitment levels, we find that with partial truthful or full commitment power, there is full revelation in equilibrium, m(s) = s and y(m) = m. In this full-revelation equilibrium, both parties have higher expected payoffs than in any of the Crawford-Sobel equilibria.
In other words, the sender in the Crawford-Sobel model reveals information partially and not fully (by sending an interval containing the state and not the state s itself) only because of lack of commitment power and not for strategic reasons. In our model, even with full commitment power the sender (seller) reveals his information only partially, for strategic reasons. Seidmann and Winter [1997] apply the Milgrom [1981] version of partial truthful commitment to the Crawford-Sobel model and arrive at similar results to what we present in this section. They also provide an example of a sender-receiver game that is similar to the Crawford-Sobel model that has, as with our model, partial disclosure of information with partial truthful commitment.
We provide the following proposition that confirms the above application of our notions of commitment power to the Crawford-Sobel model (the proof for partial truthful case is substantially shorter than Seidmann and Winter due to our use of a more specific environment). We now show that with full (or full truthful) commitment power, full revelation is also the only equilibrium outcome. If instead the sender chooses to send the same message for all states in set M, the receiver would choose
. The expected utility of the sender (given that s is in M) is
In equilibrium, this should be at least −b 2 , since the seller can obtain a utility of −b 2 by sending {s} for all s in M. This implies that the set M must be a singleton. 2
Conclusion
In this paper, we have begun the investigation of the strategic use of seller information in private-value auctions. This issue is not only intriguing theoretically, but is relevant to real situations such as procurement or privatization. Methodologically, our approach is in the spirit of the works of Kamien, Tauman, and Zamir (KTZ) [1990a and 1990b] on the value of information in a strategic conflict: 'injecting' information into a game, by public or private messages, changes the original game and induces a different game. The effect of the information is 'measured' by the 'outcome' or Nash equilibria of the induced game. The fundamental departure from the KTZ model is that while they consider an information holder who is an outside agent and not a player in the original game, we consider the seller as an information holder whose payoff is determined directly from the outcome of the game among the buyers. Our principle conclusion is that this information is useful and that the usefulness is highly dependent upon the level of commitment power the seller possesses. We show this by examining the set of equilibria under different levels of commitment power with two possible different information conditions for the seller. Under both cases, the seller uses public signals only. In the first case, the seller knows which of the two buyers has the highest value (the rankings). In the second case, the seller knows the buyers' values completely.
When only the rankings are known, we know from LRWZ that the seller can gain if the buyers become aware of their rankings. We find this gain only when the seller can commit to tell the truth or commit to a specific strategy (partial truthful, full truthful and full commitment). If the seller cannot commit, we find that under any alphabet of signals or any interpretation function of these signals, the seller cannot gain from his information and any equilibrium is equivalent to the no information equilibrium.
If, in addition, the values are known to the seller and he is able to announce either the rankings, values, the higher value, or the lower value, then the seller can gain from having partial truthful commitment power even more than with full commitment power when he knows only the rankings. Furthermore, when he has full commitment power, he can gain even more.
In future work, we plan to look further at the no commitment case. Preliminary results seem to indicate that when the seller has full information he cannot gain from his information without some commitment power, however, under a different information partition he can gain from his information even with no commitment power. We also plan to study the partial truthful commitment case under a larger set of signals to see if the seller can do strictly better. As mentioned in the introduction, we also study the question of seller information in the framework of mechanism design (Kaplan and Zamir, 2000) .
For v l = v h = v, using standard arguments, it is readily verified that the only pure-strategy equilibrium is b 1 = b 2 = v. Since bids are bounded below by zero, there is not a possibility of a mixed-strategy equilibrium (see Kaplan & Wettstein [2000] Proof: First, let us show that there are no atoms. If there are, consider the highest of such atoms. Using the arguments in the proof of Lemma A.1, this atom must be below v h . Given this, there must be some positive measure of low-value buyers that would wish to bid slightly above this atom. The rest of the argument is again as before in the proof of Lemma A.1.
Second, assume that a and b are in the support of H's strategy, while the interval (a, b) is not. Then no L buyer bids in (a, b), since bidding a is strictly better. Consequently for H also bidding a is strictly better than b in contradiction to the fact that they are both in the support of the equilibrium strategy. 2 Lemma A.3 In the equilibrium of game Γ v h , the low-value buyer must bid a continuous strictly increasing function of his value on the support of the highvalue buyer.
Proof: Given the value v h of H, let [b, b] be the support of the mixed strategy in equilibrium. Note that 0 ≤ b < b < v h (since H has positive expected payoff in equilibrium) and by Lemma A.2, buyer H's strategy has no atoms nor gaps in [b, b] . Consequently, the probability P ( For all v l > v l , the bid b 2 is strictly preferred to any bid x in [b 1 , b 2 ), since
(from P (x) being strictly increasing). Likewise, for all v l < v l , the bid b 1 is strictly preferred to all bids x in (b 1 , b 2 ]. Thus, any L buyer with value v l = v l in the interval [b, v h ], bids with probability zero in (b 1 , b 2 ) and thus P {β ∈ (b 1 , b 2 )} = 0 in contradiction to the fact that the distribution of β has no gap in [b, b] .
We proceed now to show that the (pure) bidding strategy of L, b i (v) is strictly increasing. Let has the same maximum point as the other two functions), in contradiction to the fact that the distribution of β has no atoms. By the equilibrium conditions:
and Given v h , we first show that b ≤ v h /2. Denote by G(b) the (normalized) cumulative distribution of L's bid in equilibrium that is, (note that P r{v l < v h } is the probability that a buyer's value, independent of whether he is high or low, is less than v h ), G(b) = P r{b l (v l ) < b|v l < v h } · P r{v l < v h } A buyer never bids higher than his value, which implies that l , we get
The solution to this equation, satisfying the boundary conditions F (v h /2) = 0 and F (3v h /4) = 1, is
